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Equal Injustice for All: High Quality Self-Representation 
Does Not Ensure a Matter is “Fairly Heard” 
Jona Goldschmidt* 
“To the struggling litigant obliged to rely on his own un-
aided strength we can all extend sympathy, but upon him 
who masquerades as a trained professional man ridicule 
is sure to fall.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most literature about self-representation focuses on self-represented 
litigants’ (SRLs) limited access to justice and diminished likelihood of 
success on the merits of their cases when opposing a represented party.2 
These constraints are likely a consequence of SRLs’ unfamiliarity with the 
law, court rules, and courtroom etiquette and decorum norms.3 
 
 2. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 69 (2010) (“Lawyer-represented people are more likely to prevail than 
people who appear unrepresented, on average,” but how much better “varies considerably across stud-
ies”); Mitchell Levy, Empirical Patterns of Pro Se Litigation in Federal District Courts, 85 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1819, 1843–44 (2018) (reporting that for cases with defendant SRLs, represented plaintiffs 
win between 43% and 93% of the time, depending on case type; “in essentially all categories, pro se 
litigants fare far worse than represented litigants”). For success rates of pro se criminal defendants, 
see Jona Goldschmidt & Don Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se Defense, 1996-2011: 
An Exploratory Study, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 81, 103 (2015) (reporting results of a study of federal 
criminal court data for a fifteen-year period, finding that at trial “pro se defendants (15%) were more 
likely to be found guilty than defendants with retained (5%) or appointed counsel (3%). In examining 
the rates of acquittal at trial, the rate is highest for retained (1.1%); the proportion of acquittals in 
appointed counsel (0.6%) cases were slightly lower than that for pro se defendants (0.8%)”). 
 3. As one judge put it: “When two pro se litigants appear before me, I am constrained to remem-
ber my judicial obligations. Ordinarily, neither party is even the slightest bit knowledgeable about 
‘judicial decorum’ or evidentiary rules; both are anxious to tell their stories and make their points, 
irrespective of ordinary decorum and courtesy.” Hon. Howard I. Lipsey, The Role of the Judge in Pro 
Se Litigation, 10 Divorce Litig., no. 6, 1998, at 115. In a discussion of mandatory pro bono proposals 
and the opposing argument that most lawyers are incompetent to provide specialized poverty law ser-
vices, Professor Millemann writes: 
The ultimate flaw in the “we are incompetent” argument is best revealed by acknowledg-
ing, arguendo, some truth in it. Assume that after four years of college, three years of law 
school and varying periods of law practice, some lawyers are “incompetent” to help the 
poor, either in court or outside a courtroom setting. All this despairing assumption tells us 
is that the poor are far less competent to represent themselves and do not have the readily 
available access to attaining competency that lawyers have. Competency is a comparative 
concept. Lawyers, even the least proficient lawyers, are more competent than pro se liti-
gants. 
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However, there are some rare instances where SRLs—in civil or 
criminal cases—perform quite well, to the court’s surprise. These high-
functioning, unrepresented litigants are usually literate, educated, and 
computer savvy, which enables them to conduct effective legal research.4 
These litigants also may have access to lawyers to consult with;5 be law-
yers themselves; or be exposed to legal issues through their occupation, 
such as running a business. All of these facets help these high-functioning, 
unrepresented litigants navigate the justice system.6 I will call this segment 
of the SRL population the “expert SRLs.” 
Expert SRLs act differently than disfavored SRLs in cases above the 
small claims category; but unlike expert SRLs, disfavored SRLs typically 
have no knowledge of the law or court rules, how to apply the law to their 
 
Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question: 
For, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 62 (1990). Poverty and illiteracy are also barriers to an SRL’s ability to 
effectively navigate the justice system. See Donald F. Fontaine, Fee Shifting: A Proposal to Solve 
Maine’s Intractable Access to Justice Problem, 72 ME. L. REV. 47, 83 (2020) (proposing a fee-shifting 
rule permitting prevailing SRLs to collect attorneys’ fees from institutional defendants in civil dis-
putes). 
[C]ombined with the other barriers that make it difficult for nonlawyers to adapt effectively 
to the procedures of the court, the poor suffer the additional barrier of insufficient literacy 
skills. Because unbundled services depend upon literacy skills, they appear to be of limited 
benefit to the poor. The picture of a single mother holding a child in one hand and a forcible 
entry and detainer brief in the other, ready to face a lawyer who is regularly in court is not 
a picture of equal access to justice. Pro se is not for poor people. They wisely avoid it and 
let their defaults be entered. 
Id. at 77. 
 4. See, e.g., In re Saltzman, 1997 WL 539669, at *5 n.11(Aug. 22, 1997) (“An examination of 
the trial record indicates that Saltzman made a more organized and sophisticated presentation than the 
usual pro se litigant.”), aff’d sub nom. Richeson v. Saltzman, 142 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 1998); In re 
Keeley, No. 14-22843, 2017 WL 213799, at *4 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jan. 17, 2017) (the SRL “did an 
excellent job as a pro se litigant in the presentation of her case . . . .”); In re Alexander, 270 B.R. 281, 
290 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001), aff’d 44 F. App’x 32 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[D]espite the fact that he is not an 
attorney, Alexander demonstrates remarkable understanding of complicated legal arguments and his 
pleadings and briefs are well done.”); Gorrell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:07-2247, 2008 WL 
11348408, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2008) (“The court finds that given the leeway afforded pro se 
litigants and the quality of the submissions of the plaintiff thus far, there is no need for the appointment 
of counsel in this case.”). 
 5. In one study of discrimination litigation the authors found four primary barriers to SRLs’ in-
ability to secure legal counsel. In addition to cost, distrust of lawyers, and plaintiff lawyers’ assess-
ments of the merits of their cases, their “lack of information about the legal process coupled with no 
connections to lawyers or others who know more about these processes is the most significant barrier 
we find.” Ellen Berry, Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, RIGHTS ON TRIALS: HOW WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 114 (2017). 
 6. Expert SRLs have some or many of the aforementioned characteristics. In my experience with 
the three SRLs subjects of the case studies discussed and others with whom I have had contact over 
the years, expert SRLs litigate in a manner very similar to a lawyer in terms of their quality of self-
advocacy. They read, understand, comply with, and apply the substantive law and the court’s rules, 
citing supporting authorities in their papers. Their pleadings are clear and generally well written. And 
based on a reading of transcripts of hearings in the cases described, I find all three are generally effec-
tive oral advocates in the court room. 
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case, or the “pests” or “kooks” with political agendas which courts may 
occasionally encounter and abhor.7 I have found no empirical studies fo-
cusing on the subject of expert SRLs, and this may be because there are so 
few SRLs who fall into that category. Regardless of literacy and other 
skills, even expert SRLs face barriers to fair treatment in the justice sys-
tem. 
In this Article, I challenge an assumption upon which many access-
to-justice programs are based: that because effective self-representation 
can be taught, being an expert SRL will ensure that their case will be fairly 
heard.8 The case studies described below show that expert SRLs are vul-
nerable—like the less competent SRLs—to experiencing a miscarriage of 
justice that injures their case; whereas a represented party or their lawyer 
would not suffer the same injury. In considering the case studies described 
below, one may surmise that there is truth to the quotation cited at the 
beginning of this Article; that is, judges may be prone to seeing expert 
SRLs as “masquerading” as lawyers, “ridiculing” them by holding them 
more strictly to procedural and evidentiary rules than lawyers—and in 
some cases, unfairly sanctioning expert SRLs for litigating their cases like 
lawyers. 
In light of lacking empirical data on expert SRLs, I offer three cases 
in which I was personally involved as illustrations of this Article’s thesis. 
I conclude with the recommendation that courts should adopt a policy, 
which at a minimum encourages judges to provide reasonable accommo-
dations so that SRLs’ cases are fairly heard. This would be a change to the 
 
 7. In a national survey, some state court judges consider SRLs who come to court with a “polit-
ical agenda” as “pests” or “kooks.” JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, BARRY MAHONEY, HARVEY SOLOMON & 
JONA GREEN, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR 
JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 60 (1998). 
 8. This philosophy also appears in the ABA’s standards for legal services providers: “Strategies 
that employ various forms of limited assistance, such as advice lines, community legal education and 
assistance to pro se litigants should also be examined to determine the degree to which those who are 
assisted learn how to help themselves and accomplish meaningful results with the assistance offered.” 
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA, STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION 
OF CIVIL LEGAL AID 44 (2006), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defense/re-
source_center_for_access_to_justice/standards-and-policy/standards-for-the-provision-of-civil-legal-
aid/ [https://perma.cc/D4PD-RXWC]. Written self-help materials are commonly used by courts to 
guide SRLs through the justice system, but these have been shown to be largely ineffective for many 
SRLs. Numerous barriers keep SRLs from being able to use self-help materials beyond the materials 
themselves and these include: (a) “overtaxed bandwidth” (referring to “prospective memory” for 
things that need to be remembered to defend one’s case in court); (b) anxiety and feelings of threat 
(“paralyzing emotions”) regarding the court experience; (c) legal mundanity (i.e., where to go, where 
to sit, who speaks when, and what will occur next); (d) excessive focus in existing materials on trying 
to teach legal concepts and legal jargon, rather than procedures; (e) a lack of learning tools such as 
analogies and images; and (f) misuse of all-caps typography and use of long sentences. D. James 
Greiner, Dalie Jimenez & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1126–36 (2017). 
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current policy in some states that merely permit judges to provide reason-
able accommodations to SRLs as a matter of judicial discretion. However, 
it is my view that the ideal means to prevent the types of injustices de-
scribed below is to establish a judicial duty to provide reasonable accom-
modations, so that cases are fairly heard and reviewed on the merits. 
I. THE PROMISE OF “REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS” 
A. General Rules for SRL Management 
The United States Supreme Court announced general rules governing 
the treatment of SRLs in two seminal decisions: Faretta v. California9 and 
McKaskle v. Wiggins.10 While those cases involved self-represented crim-
inal defendants, the courts have applied those same general rules to civil 
cases with only slight modification.11 
Faretta is best known for recognizing a constitutional right to self-
representation.12 Defendant Faretta was “literate, competent, and under-
standing, and . . . was voluntarily exercising his informed free will” in 
 
 9. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 
(1972) (stating that a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 civil rights complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” 
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Erickson v. Par-
dus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (holding that even under the new “plausibility test,” SRLs are still entitled to 
their day in court despite “inartful pleadings” if the pleadings raise plausible allegations). The Court 
has not extended the liberality rule beyond SRLs’ papers. 
 10. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
 11. See, e.g., Fraisar v. Gillis, 892 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (“[D]istrict judges have 
no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants[;] . . . being too proactive on the pro se 
litigant’s behalf can undermine a judge’s role as an impartial decision maker. . . The same certainly 
applies in the civil context.” (citing Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231, (2004); Browne v. Gore, No. 
SX-10-CV-155, 2011 WL 13055217, at *5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2011). As an author of a treatise 
on federal practice writes: In addition to the habeas context, “[a]ppropriate or not, exasperation with 
prisoner litigation in general could lead some judges to be less charitable to pro se prisoner civil rights 
claims as well, despite the Supreme Court’s admonitions to the contrary.” EDWARD BRUNET, JOHN 
PARRY & MARTIN REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:10 n.5, Westlaw 
(database updated November 2020). 
 12. The case involved a trial judge who refused to permit the defendant to self-represent, despite 
his apparent competence to do so, and his knowing an intelligent waiver of counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. 
at 810. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the refusal was a Sixth Amendment violation based on an 
analysis of English common law; language in Colonial charters; the federal statutory right to self-
representation established by the Judiciary Act of 1789; the language of the Sixth Amendment itself, 
which speaks of a right to “assistance of counsel”; and the right of every individual to personal auton-
omy. Id. at 807–34. In vacating Faretta’s conviction, Justice Stewart concluded the majority opinion 
with an admonition that before being allowed to represent themselves, pro se defendants must establish 
they knowingly and intelligently waive their right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 835. In addition, 
“[pro se defendants] should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, 
so that the record will establish that ‘[the defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.’” Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 
(1942)). Faretta “clearly and unequivocally” informed the court of his choice to represent himself and 
did not want counsel. Id. 
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waiving his right to counsel, and—most importantly for this discussion— 
“his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment 
of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”13 
The Faretta decision recited several principles for courts’ manage-
ment of SRLs in footnote 46.14 Most relevant here is the comment that the 
right to self-representation is not “a license not to comply with relevant 
rules of procedural and substantive law.”15 So an SRL is not required to 
have technical legal knowledge to waive his or her right to self-represen-
tation,16 but paradoxically must “comply with relevant rules of procedural 
and substantive law.”17 Justice Stewart does not note any exceptions to the 
latter requirement.18 Most courts have taken Justice Stewart’s statements 
to mean that an SRL is encumbered to learn the law and to strictly follow 
it.19 
 
 13. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835–36. 
 14. These principles include the following: (1) “the trial judge may terminate self-representation 
by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct”; (2) “a State may—
even over objection by the accused—appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the 
accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the 
defendant’s self-representation is necessary”; (3) an SRL may not “abuse the dignity of the court-
room”; and (5) an SRL “cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a 
denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 834, n.46. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Faretta’s “technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his know-
ing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Id. at 836. 
 17. Id. at 834, n.46. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Courts take either a conservative or liberal approach to rule compliance by SRLs (also re-
ferred to as the majority and minority views, respectively): 
 [The] two positions differ quite a bit from each other. The first takes the view that it 
is best when a judge accords the self-represented litigant no “special treatment.” Exceptions 
exist, but they are limited. The emotional message that seems embedded in the majority 
view is that self-representation is a voluntary choice, it is moreover a foolish choice, and 
litigants who put themselves in this position “deserve” the consequences of that choice. 
The minority view is the opposite: a judge has a duty to accommodate the special circum-
stances of the unrepresented litigant up to the point that such accommodation infringes on 
the rights of the other side. The emotional message in minority view opinions is that a 
person’s lack of counsel likely is not voluntary and is instead the result of a lack of means—
but that even if voluntary, self-representation is a choice vouchsafed by the Constitution. 
The court has an obligation to provide as fair a process for the uninformed and unsophisti-
cated citizen as for the one who can afford the most accomplished and aggressive attorney 
 . . . 
 These contrasting standards give very different messages to the trial judge attempting 
to cope with an unrepresented litigant in the courtroom. The first posits a basically passive 
role for the judge, with the litigant bearing the burden of becoming sufficiently familiar 
with the law, rules of procedure, and rules of evidence to function as a lawyer. The second 
instructs the judge to aid the unrepresented litigant, who cannot be expected to perform as 
a trained lawyer would, in every way short of prejudicing the opponent. 
Rebecca A. Albrecht, John M. Greacen, Bonnie Rose Hough & Richard Zorza, Judicial Techniques 
for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGES’ J., no. 1, Winter 2003, at 16, 43-44. But 
see JOHN M. GREACEN & MICHAEL HOULBERG, INST. FOR THE ADVancement OF THE AM. LEGAL 
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In McKaskle, the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist a 
self-represented defendant in a state robbery trial.20 Wiggins complained 
that standby counsel engaged in unsolicited and overzealous actions that 
interfered with the presentation of his defense.21 The Court rejected Wig-
gins’ claim because counsel’s actions did not destroy the jury’s perception 
that the defendant was representing himself, and because counsel’s actions 
did not interfere with the control of his defense.22 Wiggins’ case arose out 
of a criminal prosecution, and Justice O’Connor devoted the majority 
opinion exclusively to assessing the nature and scope of the role of standby 
counsel appointed to a pro se defendant in criminal cases.23 But in the 
course of describing possible forms of assistance by standby counsel that 
would not violate a defendant’s right to self-representation,24 Justice 
O’Connor added the following unrelated comments in dicta: 
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal 
instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does the 
Constitution require judges to take over chores for a pro se defendant 
that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of 
course. Faretta recognized as much. “The right of self-representation 
is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a 
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substan-
tive law.”25 
 
SYS., ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD: GUIDANCE FOR TRIAL JUDGES IN CASES INVOLVING SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (Nov. 2019), https://iaals.du.edu/publications/ensuring-right-be-heard 
[https://perma.cc/9GKR-Y57L]; McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (affirming dismissal 
of a pro se federal tort claims action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing and 
addressing the issue of pro se procedural errors as follows: “[W]e have never suggested that procedural 
rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed 
without counsel. As we have noted before, ‘in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to 
the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded admin-
istration of the law.’” (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). See also PHH 
Mortg. V. Nickerson, 374.P.3d 551, 160 Idaho 388 (Idaho 2016) (motion to reconsider not timely 
filed; “Pro se civil litigants are not accorded special latitude merely because they chose to proceed 
through litigation without the assistance of an attorney. Further, pro se litigants are held the same 
standards and rules as those represented by an attorney.”); Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 
(Ind. 2014) (holding SRLs are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-repre-
sented); State v. Sellers, 858 N.W.2d 577, 584 (Neb. 2015) (holding SRLs to the same standards as 
one who is represented by counsel); In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 433 N.E.3d 
173, 178-79 (Ohio 2013) (holding SRLs are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal proce-
dures, and they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel); Reasor v. 
Jordan, 110 So.3d 307, 312 (Miss. 2013) (same). 
 20. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984). 
 21. Id. at 176. 
 22. Id. at 178. 
 23. Id. at 176–82. 
 24. Id. at 183. 
 25. Id. at 183–84. This language has been cited by courts in civil matters. See, e.g., Mala v. 
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is no case law requiring courts 
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Many subsequent decisions by lower courts cite the Court’s language 
regarding rule compliance.26 The McKaskle Court sought to preempt the 
question: If there is no standby counsel, who will assist the unrepresented 
defendant? The Court may have sought to foreclose the possibility of fu-
ture suggestions that judges themselves provide some assistance to SRLs. 
B. ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2.2, Comment [4] 
Since the late 1990s, despite the Supreme Court’s “hands off” policy 
with respect to judges assisting SRLs with rule compliance, state and fed-
eral court administrators⎯having noticed the increasing presence of SRLs 
in courts nationwide⎯developed a plethora of services and programs for 
them.27 These “access-to-justice” programs include not only self-service 
centers for distribution of appropriate forms but also educational programs 
such as clinics conducted by pro bono lawyers, videos, and other means of 
instruction designed to teach SRLs the law and court rules applicable to 
their case.28 The information provided by these programs is very general 
in order to avoid unauthorized practice of law violations by court staff and 
potential malpractice implications of unintended attorney-client relation-
ships.29 
 
to provide general legal advice to pro se parties. . . In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly concluded that courts are under no such obligation.”); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 
1219 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The trial court is under no obligation to become an ‘advocate’ for or to assist 
and guide the pro se layman through the trial thicket.”); Fraisar v. Gillis, 892 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2006) (“This Court is not aware of, nor has Fraisar cited, any authority for his contention that court 
functionaries are required to accomplish service for a pro se litigant or explain to a litigant requesting 
such assistance that it does not perform the same.”). 
 26. Id.; see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (affirming dismissal of a pro 
se federal tort claims action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing); Pliler v. 
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231–32 (2004) (district courts are not required to give the particular advisements 
required by the Ninth Circuit before dismissing a pro se petitioner’s mixed habeas petition).  
 27. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT & IRA PILCHEN, USER-FRIENDLY JUSTICE: MAKING YOUR COURT 
MORE ACCESSIBLE, EASIER TO UNDERSTAND, AND SIMPLER TO USE (1996); Goldschmidt, supra note 
2, at 68–102; JOHN GREACEN, SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS REMOTELY: A RESOURCE 
GUIDE (2016), https://www.srln.org/system/files/attachments/Remote%20Guide%20Final%208-16-
16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9UB-JYPS]; Best Practices in Court-Based Programs for the Self-Rep-
resented: Concepts, Attributes, Issues for Exploration, Examples, Contacts, and Resources, STATE 
JUST. INST. (2008), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/accessfair/id/328 
[https://perma.cc/3QYK-SJFC]; Jefri Wood, Pro Se Case Management for Nonprisoner Civil Litiga-
tion, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/Pro_Se_Case_Manage-
ment_for_Nonprisoner_Civil_Litigation.pdf. [https://perma.cc/C25R-BU7M]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Matthew Longobardi, Unauthorized Practice of Law and Meaningful Access 
to the Courts: Is Law Too Important to Be Left to Lawyers?, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2043, 2046 (2014) 
(arguing that a state’s interest in having UPL rules is outweighed by low-income litigants’ interests in 
seeking affordable legal services); Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Lim-
its: The Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litiga-
2021] Equal Injustice for All 83 
The available data show that SRLs’ satisfaction with these programs 
is high.30 But, as noted earlier, the data also show that SRLs, on average, 
continue to be less likely to prevail than represented parties.31 With few 
exceptions,32 these programs as a whole do not provide individualized in-
structions that SRLs need about the application of the law to their case nor 
do they instruct SRLs on methods used to respond to motions, develop 
trial strategy, the best means to present evidence, or other litigation me-
chanics. This leaves SRLs to their own devices in learning the law, apply-
ing the law to their case, and drafting proper submissions to a court. 
To address the challenge facing courts presiding over SRL cases that 
have merit but are not properly litigated to the detriment of that party, 
some scholars, including myself, called upon the ABA to establish a judi-
cial duty of reasonable assistance for SRLs based on the common law33 
and continuing practice in Commonwealth countries in order to address 
 
tion, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 170 (2012) (“[A]ttorneys providing lim-
ited representation operate in uncharted waters with little confidence in being protected against mal-
practice and ethical complaints.”) (citing case law and articles on the subject). 
 30. See, e.g., Lonni Summers, Bradley Powers & Jamie Walter, Perceptions of Remote and 
Walk-In Service Delivery in Family Law Cases, 57 FAM. CT. REV. 501, 508–09 (2019) (94% of clients 
across several program types agreed or strongly agreed with the satisfaction survey question; and re-
sponses to the open-ended responses were “overwhelmingly favorable”). 
 31. See supra note 2. 
 32. Noteworthy is the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ William J. Hibler 
Memorial Pro Se Assistance Program, described as follows: 
Volunteer attorneys complete scheduled shifts, providing limited legal assistance to pro se 
litigants at the Dirksen Federal Courthouse on all phases of federal litigation. Malpractice 
insurance is provided through the program’s legal aid partner, LAF (formerly the Legal 
Assistance Foundation of Chicago) [;] Time Commitment: Each shift is 3 hours, and vol-
unteers are asked to staff at least one shift per month. A sign-up sheet is sent out each 
month allowing volunteers to choose a shift that fits their schedules[;] Training Require-
ments: The half-day, on-site training consists of shadowing an experienced volunteer for 
one shift, followed by an opportunity for a legal aid staff attorney to observe and provide 
feedback to the volunteer as he or she works with clients independently. An experienced 
staff attorney is always available to answer questions and provide ongoing support to vol-
unteers. Volunteers may work in teams[;] Other Requirements: Volunteers must be mem-
bers of the Northern District Trial Bar and have at least three years of federal court expe-
rience and a valid Illinois law license (active, inactive, or retired status). Experience in 
employment discrimination or civil rights law is helpful, but not required. 
Northern District Pro Bono Programs–Trial Bar Pro Bono Program, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N. DIST. 
OF ILL., https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/Pages.aspx?BQuMZcPiD1N2onwVG/J4/Q. 
[https://perma.cc/2N66-ATR8]. 
 33. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 349 (“[T]he judge 
shall be counsel for the prisoner; that is, shall see that the proceedings against him are legal and strictly 
regular.”). However, this did not include tactical advice in formulating a defense, or acting as the pro 
se defendant’s attorney. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY TRIAL 30 (2003). 
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these fundamental gaps in pro se education.34 The ABA answered our call 
when it added a new Comment to Rule 2.2 of the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct (MCJC).35 
MCJC Rule 2.2 states that “[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law, 
and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”36 
ABA Comment [4] states: “It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to 
make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the oppor-
tunity to have their matters fairly heard.” 37 Note that the language is dis-
cretionary, and there is no definition—nor are any examples given—of 
“reasonable accommodations.” 
In 2012, the Conference of Chief Justices (COCJ) and the Confer-
ence of State Court Administrators (COSCA) passed joint Resolution 2, 
entitled In Support of Expanding Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct to Reference Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants.38 
The state ethics rule drafters debated whether Comment [4] should state 
that it applies to all litigants, rather than specifically mentioning pro se 
litigants as it does.39 The resolution states that “the Conferences agree that 
Rule 2.2 should specifically address cases involving self-represented liti-
gants.”40 Also, the resolution “suggest states modify the comments to Rule 
2.2 to reflect local rules and practices regarding specific actions judges can 
take to exercise their discretion in cases involving self-represented liti-
gants.”41 
Seven states have since adopted Comment [4] verbatim;42 twenty-
three states have adopted some variation of it.43 The variations in some 
 
 34. See Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the 
Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. STATE J. INT’L L. 601, 630–31 (2008-) (describing the Canadian ju-
dicial duty of reasonable assistance, based on the duty to ensure trial fairness, and arguing for its 
adoption by U.S. courts). 
 35. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
 36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 37. Id. 
 38. CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTS. & CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, Resolution 2 In Support of Expand-
ing Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct to Reference Cases Involving Self-Repre-
sented Litigants, (July 25, 2012), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/23747/07252012-
support-expanding-rule-aba-model-code-judicial-conduct-self-representing-litigants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96U2-SEM9] [hereinafter Resolution 2]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. States adopting a comment identical to the ABA’s Comment [4] in their judicial ethics codes, 
include: Hawaii, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Indiana, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Minnesota, Rule 2.2, Com-
ment [4]; Nevada, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Oklahoma, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Utah, Rule 2.2, Com-
ment [3]; and Washington, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]. 
 43. The states (and D.C.) adopting some variation of the ABA’s Comment [4] in their judicial 
ethics codes, include: Arizona, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Arkansas, Rule 2.2(B), Comment [4]; Califor-
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cases include examples of what “reasonable accommodations” means,44 
which is lacking in the ABA’s Comment [4] but encouraged by Resolution 
2.45 These examples are very general and include such “accommodations” 
that really should be requirements, e.g., Arkansas’s list includes (1) mak-
ing referrals to any resources available to assist the litigant in the prepara-
tion of the case; (2) liberally construing pleadings to facilitate considera-
tion of the issues raised; (3) providing general information about proceed-
ing and foundational requirements; (4) attempting to make legal concepts 
understandable by using plain language whenever possible; (5) asking 
neutral questions to elicit or clarify information; (5) modifying the tradi-
tional order of taking evidence; and (6) explaining the basis for a ruling.46 
Unfortunately, only about one-half of the states have adopted a “rea-
sonable accommodations” rule in their judicial conduct codes. Without 
exception, states which provide judges with the authority to make reason-
able accommodations make it (consistent with the ABA’s Comment [4]) 
discretionary under all variations of the rule rather than mandatory. Aside 
from the few states that articulate examples of reasonable accommoda-
tions,47 state judges are given no guidance as to when the reasonable ac-
commodations rule should apply. There is scant case law involving Com-
ment [4], and none of it holds that reasonable accommodations are man-
datory or a right48 nor is there a federal equivalent Rule 2.2, Comment 
[4].49 
 
nia, Canon 3B(8), Advisory Comm. Comment; Connecticut, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; District of Co-
lumbia, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Idaho, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Illinois, Canon 3(A)(4); Iowa, Rule 
51: 2.2, Comment [4]; Kansas, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Kentucky, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Maryland, 
Rule 18-102.2(b); Massachusetts, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Maine, Rule 2.6(C); Missouri, Rule 2-2.2, 
Comment [4]; Montana, Rule 2.2, Comment [5]; Nebraska, § 5-302.2 (Canon 2), Comment [4]; New 
Hampshire, Rule 2.2(B), Comment [4]; New Jersey, Rule 3.7, Comment; New Mexico, Rule 21-202, 
Comment [4]; North Dakota, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Ohio, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Pennsylvania, 
Rule 2.2, Comment [4]; Rhode Island, Rule 2.2(B); and Tennessee, Rule 2.2, Comment [4]. 
 44. See supra note 37. 
 45. Resolution 2, supra note 39. 
 46. JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT r. 2.2(B), cmt. [4]; see also Richard Zorza, The Disconnect 
Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, 
Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004) (arguing judicial neutrality 
is not mutually exclusive with judicial engagement). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Spring v. Wick, No. 2013–G–3163, 2014 WL 2958305, at *24–25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014); 
Levi v. Gordon, 356 P.3d 1045 (Haw. Ct. App. 2015); Reyes v. City of Phoenix, No. 17-04741-PHX-
JAT, 2018 WL 4377161, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2018). 
 49. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CANON 3 (2019) (“A Judge Should 
Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, Impartially and Diligently,”), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges 
[https://perma.cc/45ND-XH83]. Comment [4] to Canon 3 states: “A judge should accord to every 
person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, and that person’s lawyer, the full right to be heard 
according to law.” Id. 
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When considering the following three case studies, the reader should 
keep in mind this review of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements with 
respect to courts’ strict treatment of SRLs and ask themselves, in light of 
the growing state adoption of Comment [4]: (1) whether the judges in these 
cases (at trial and on appeal) had the opportunity to affirmatively exercise 
their discretion to offer reasonable accommodations that would have as-
sisted the SRLs having their cases fairly heard on the merits; (2) whether 
the benefit of procedural justice and fair treatment of the SRLs would have 
outweighed the cost of time and effort the court would have expended to 
provide those accommodations; and (3) whether a court providing reason-
able accommodations in these matters would have contributed to the 
SRLs’ and the public’s trust and confidence in the courts. 
II. CASE #1: THE CLAIM FOR RETURN OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 
PAYMENT 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Philip Goldberg is a retired banker with an MBA and, based on my 
contacts with him, I see him as sort of frustrated lawyer.50 He is an expe-
rienced SRL, having previously litigated several successful cases against 
his homeowners’ association (HOA)—in whole or in part—with the most 
recent being eight years prior to this filing. Goldberg knows the rules of 
civil procedure and filed clearly written, detailed, pleadings citing to rele-
vant authorities. This case is described in greater depth than the other two 
case studies which follow because it went to trial on multiple counts and 
legal issues. However, this was a small claims case because the damages 
sought were within the statutory limit for such cases in Illinois.51 It was 
not “small” in the terms of legal complexity52 as multiple statutes were 
relevant to the four counts. Discovery became an issue53 and motion hear-
ings were held in which the rules of evidence were strictly applied (only 
to Goldberg) contrary to the court rules that permitted the courts to relax 
 
 50. He sought me out to discuss this case when the matter was pending, but I advised him that 
my professional university obligations prevented me from representing him in the matter. Goldberg 
responded that he was not seeking representation; rather, having learned about my interest in self-
representation, he just wanted me to “see how the Illinois courts treat pro se litigants.” 
 51. A small claim under Illinois law is defined as “a civil action based on either tort or contract 
for money not in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 281. 
 52. Defendants conceded in an early motion to continue the first trial date that the “issues pre-
sented . . . are complex.” Goldberg Case, Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Continue Trial Date, at ¶ 
5 (on file with author). 
 53. Under the rules, “(a) No depositions shall be taken or interrogatories or other discovery pro-
ceeding or requests to admit be used prior to trial in small claims except by leave of court. (b) Motions. 
Except as provided in sections 2-619 and 2-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure [motions to dismiss], 
no motion shall be filed in small claims cases, without prior leave of court.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 287. 
2021] Equal Injustice for All 87 
the rules of evidence in small claims cases.54 This case most assuredly be-
came a battle the HOA’s counsel had not expected when they entered their 
appearance against the expert plaintiff SRL.55 
Goldberg’s complaint challenged the HOA’s imposition of a $7,500 
special assessment for road repairs and other claims not discussed here.56 
It was separated into six counts (unusual for the typical small claims case) 
four of which survived a motion to dismiss.57 Count I is most relevant here: 
The board member ineligibility claim. Goldberg claimed that the board’s 
special assessment vote was void ab initio because one of the three board 
members was ineligible to serve as a board member of the HOA.58 The 
putative board member (1) was not a property owner and thus not a “mem-
ber” of the HOA, and (2) because state law specifically requires nominees 
for board positions be selected “from among the membership” of the 
HOA.59 
 
 54. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 286 states: 
In any small claims case, the court may, on its own motion or on motion of any party, 
adjudicate the dispute at an informal hearing. At the informal hearing all relevant evidence 
shall be admissible and the court may relax the rules of procedure and the rules of evidence. 
The court may call any person present at the hearing to testify and may conduct or partici-
pate in direct and cross-examination of any witness or party. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing the court shall render judgment and explain the reasons therefor to all parties. 
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 286 (emphasis added). 
 55. See Brian L. Champion, Defending Against a Pro Se Plaintiff: When the Plaintiff Is David 
and You’re Goliath, 20 ME. BAR J. 236, 239 (2005) (“[D]o not be lulled into thinking that any pro se 
matter brought against your client will be an easy case. It may very well turn out to be the most diffi-
cult, trying, and potentially embarrassing case of your career.”). 
 56. Complaint for Monetary Relief, Goldberg v. Glenstone Homeowners Ass’n, No. 14 SC 1870 
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 19, 2014). 
 57. The claims can be summarized as follows: Count I – The defendant HOA’s Board of Direc-
tors is illegally constituted because one putative board member is not an owner of property within the 
HOA, thus not a member of the association, and is therefore ineligible to sit on its 3-member board of 
directors; Count II – The special assessment the HOA imposed on Goldberg for road repairs violates 
the association’s Declaration because it was not adopted in strict compliance with the association’s 
Declaration and bylaws; Count III – The HOA’s imposition of the special assessment was fraudulent 
and violated the Deceptive Practices Act [dismissed]; Count IV – The HOA failed to issue a proper 
notice of a special meeting of homeowners to challenge the assessment which Goldberg requested 
[dismissed]; Count V – Goldberg, not exclusively the HOA, had legal authority over his private road, 
according to his deed and the subdivision plat, thus limiting its authority to impose a special assess-
ment for unnecessary repairs of his road, and Count VI – The HOA had no authority to repair and 
maintain a lot not contained within the subdivision common elements, and charge him and other home-
owners for it via the subject special assessment for road repairs purportedly for HOA property repair. 
 58. Because the HOA is a not-for-profit corporation, the Illinois Not-for-Profit Act requires that 
its board consist of not less than three members. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/108.10(a) (1986) (“The 
board of directors of a corporation shall consist of three or more directors.”). 
 59. Illinois Common Interest Community Association Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/1-25(A) 
(2015) (“Elections shall be held in accordance with the community instruments, provided that an elec-
tion shall be held no less frequently than once every 24 months, for the board of managers or board of 
directors from among the membership of a common interest community association.” (emphasis 
added)) [hereinafter CICAA]. Despite language in the HOA’s Declaration that provided that board 
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The matter was tried on the four surviving counts; and on defense 
motion at the close of Goldberg’s case, the trial court entered directed find-
ings in the defense’s favor on all counts without any evidence being of-
fered.60 Both sides sought sanctions from the trial court for their litigation 
conduct, but only those sought by counsel against Goldberg were 
awarded.61 Goldberg appealed the decision to the Illinois Appellate Court. 
The court affirmed the trial court’s every ruling in a 36-page unpublished 
opinion, holding that Goldberg’s claims were frivolous and granting coun-
sel’s second petition for additional sanctions on appeal (in the amount of 
$15,952.90). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal;62 thus, 
for his trouble in seeking reimbursement of the $7,500 paid assessment, 
Goldberg was forced to pay over $32,625.65 in fees, costs, and interest to 
the HOA. 63 
B. Reasonable Accommodations Not Provided 
1. Preventing, Sanctioning, and Not Engaging in Unprofessional Conduct 
a. False Statement of Law/Failure to Disclose Adverse Authority 
The court in Goldberg’s case failed to provide reasonable accommo-
dations in several respects. First, it failed to prevent sharp practices taken 
against him by defense counsel which violates ethical norms. The court 
also exhibited bias against Goldberg and engaged in questionable ethical 
conduct by seemingly coaching opposing counsel as reflected in three in-
stances. Opposing counsels’ memorandum of law in support of their mo-
 
members were to be elected “by the members” of the HOA to give effect to the Declaration language, 
he argued, would not only contravene explicit state law but could also result in a non-property owner 
and non-association member being elected to the HOA board. Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870. 
 60. Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870. 
 61. Order of the Court, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (granting attorney’s fees and costs against 
Goldberg in the amount of $16,672.75). 
 62. Goldberg v. Glenstone Homeowners Ass’n, No. 2-14-1025, 2015 WL 7568483 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016), pet. for leave to appeal denied, 50 N.E.3d 1139 (Ill. 2016). 
 63. The Illinois Judicial Code has an equivalent to the ABA MCJC’s Rule 2.2, Comment [4]. 
The provision states: “A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, 
or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge may make reasonable efforts, 
consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of self-represented litigants to be fairly 
heard.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 63(A)(4). Also in effect was the Illinois Access to Justice Act. 705 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 95/1 (2013). 
2021] Equal Injustice for All 89 
tion to dismiss Count I misrepresented the language of the Illinois Com-
mon Interest Community Association Act (CICAA)64 by omitting the ad-
verse provision that would have defeated their claim.65 That is, the mem-
orandum stated that HOA boards are “a group of people elected by the 
members,”66 thus implying that anyone, property owner or not, could sit 
on the board.67 They also alleged that “[n]either statute [referring to the 
CICAA or the Illinois General Not-for-Profit Corporation Act 
(GNFPCA)] require[s] that a member of the board be a record title 
owner.”68 And so, counsel asserted that Goldberg’s claim that directors 
must be elected “from among” its members must be dismissed because 
 
 64. See supra note 61. 
 65. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (“[A] lawyer shall not knowingly … (1) 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or 
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; [or] (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority 
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client 
and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”); David L. Hudson Jr., Lawyers Have a Duty to Disclose 
Adverse Legal Authority Even If It Hurts Their Case, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2019) (noting that ABA For-
mal Opinion 280 stated that “‘The test in every case should be: Is the decision which opposing counsel 
has overlooked one which the court should clearly consider in deciding the case?’”), https://www.aba-
journal.com/magazine/article/duty-to-disclose-adverse-legal-authority [https://perma.cc/3K87-
H9DZ]; Alan D. Strasser, Candor Toward the Tribunal: The Duty to Cite Adverse Authority), A.B.A. 
J. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/ethics-professional-
ism/practice/2021/candor-toward-the-tribunal-the-duty-to-cite-adverse-authority/ 
[https://perma.cc/W93Z-2X69]; see also Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 3.3(a)(1), (3) (the Illinois equivalent to the 
ABA candor rule in effect at the time of the trial). 
 66. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 
(emphasis added). 
 67. The CICAA defines an HOA “Member” as “the person or entity designated as an owner and 
entitled to one vote as defined by the community instruments.” 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/1-5 (2010). 
The HOA’s Declaration is silent regarding a requirement that directors be property owners and likely 
a scrivener’s error. However, the CICAA, provides a “common interest community association shall 
be in full compliance with the provisions of this Act no later than January 1, 2012,” thus making this 
statutory eligibility requirement a part of the HOA Declaration and binding on it. 765 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 160/1-80. The Act also provides for a method of amending HOA Declarations to make them 
consistent with the Act:. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/1-60(a). The trial judge never consulted the 
statute to parse out its provisions and their applicability to the case; but the Declaration does provide 
that “Every Owner of any Lot which is subject to assessment, in whole or in part, shall automatically 
be a member of the association and shall remain one so long as he remains an Owner of Lot subject 
thereto.” HOA Declaration, art. 3, § 1 (1985) (on file with author). Because he was not a lot owner, 
the putative board member was ineligible to become a board member. The next section discusses the 
HOA’s alternative argument, to wit, the putative board member did not need to be a member of the 
HOA since he was a beneficiary of a land trust. See infra Section II(B)(2). 
 68. The HOA cited to the definitional section of the CICAA, 765 ILL COMP. STAT. 160/1-5, 
failing to cite or address the more specific section governing election eligibility under 765 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 160/1-25(a) upon which Goldberg relied on. Counsel presumably wished to avoid the conse-
quences of the bedrock rule of statutory construction that was adverse to their clients’ position. See 
People ex rel. Madigan v. Burge, 18 N.E.3d 14, 22–23 (Ill. 2014) (stating that when two conflicting 
statutes cover the same subject, “the law is settled that [h]owever inclusive may be the general lan-
guage of a statute, it will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the 
same enactment”). Here, the elections method provision was far more specific than the definitional 
section of the statute. 
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“this definition is not in the statute” and “there is no legal or factual sup-
port whatsoever for Plaintiff’s frivolous cause of action.”69 The lawyers 
not only falsely denied the existence of adverse law in their pleadings70 
but also made assertions without basis in law71 in open court: “First of all, 
Your Honor, Mr. Goldberg, what he pulled from that statute is not what it 
says. What it says in his complaint is not what the statute says and what 
he’s saying now is not what the statute says.”72 Had the lawyers quoted the 
aforementioned adverse authority accurately, the HOA’s argument that 
non-property owners could sit on an HOA board would have been de-
feated. Instead, the trial court relied on counsel’s representations, did not 
independently ascertain the correct statement of law, and ruled in favor of 
the HOA.73 
b. Withholding Material Evidence and Judicial Bias 
Lawyers have an ethical duty not to “unlawfully obstruct another 
party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a docu-
ment or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall 
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.”74 Nor may a law-
yer “in trial . . .  assert personal knowledge of facts in issue.”75 Both of 
these duties were violated by opposing counsel in Goldberg’s case. The 
HOA’s putative board member claimed to be eligible to sit as a board 
member by virtue of being a beneficiary of his wife’s “land trust.”76 A land 
trust permits property owners to conceal their identity by placing title in a 
trust managed by a bank as trustee with the owner(s) named as confidential 
 
 69. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870. 
 70. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/1-25(a). The statute provides “[a] common interest commu-
nity association shall be in full compliance with the provisions of this Act no later than January 1, 
2012.” 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/1-80. 
 71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, 
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law.”). 
 72. Trial Transcript at 9, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (transcript from proceedings on Sept. 19, 
2014). 
 73. Id. at 18–19. The colloquy went as follows: 
THE COURT: Again, they don’t have to prove it. They don’t have to prove it. You’re the 
plaintiff. So far what I’ve got here says that he doesn’t have to be a member. He has to be 
elected by the members. Okay? That’s what I’ve got. 
MR. GOLDBERG: It has to be not by, from among. It does not say by election shall be 
held from among membership, not by the membership, it’s from among the membership. 
THE COURT: I’ve already ruled. Okay? 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a). 
 75. Id. at ¶ (e). 
 76. Trial Transcript, supra note 74, at 11. 
2021] Equal Injustice for All 91 
beneficiaries.77 Beneficiaries have the power to direct the trustee to parti-
tion, sell, or otherwise convey title to trust property,78 which cannot be 
done by beneficiaries of a revocable living trust.79 Thus, the trust docu-
ment was material evidence. 
The record does not show that counsel ever showed Goldberg the 
trust document at trial, even though counsel shared it with the court.80 
Goldberg submitted a certified copy of a document reflecting the filing of 
the putative board member’s property conveyance, describing the docu-
ment as a “revocable living trust.”81 However, counsel represented to the 
court in lieu of testimonial evidence that the trust was a land trust.82 Before 
 
 77. Land trust means “any express agreement or arrangement whereof a use, confidence or trust 
is declared of any land, or of any charge upon land, for the use or benefit of any beneficiary, under 
which the title to real property, both legal and equitable, is held by a trustee, subject only to the exe-
cution of the trust, which may be enforced by the beneficiaries who have the exclusive right to manage 
and control the real estate, to have the possession thereof, to receive the net proceeds from the rental, 
sale, hypothecation or other disposition thereof, and under which the interest of the beneficiary is 
personal property only.” 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1. A land trust primarily serves as a vehicle in real 
estate transactions to maintain secrecy of ownership and allow ease of transfer. FirstMerit Bank, N.A. 
v. Soltys, 29 N.E.3d 568, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 78. See Toushin v. Ruggiero, 38 N.E.3d 130, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Azar v. Old Willow Falls 
Condo. Ass’n, 593 N.E.2d 583, 586 (Ill. 1992) (“Thus, it is readily apparent that true ownership in a 
land trust lies with the beneficiaries, although title lies with the trustee.”); see also First Chicago Tr. 
Co. of Illinois v. Old Willow Falls Condo. Ass’n, 593 N.E.2d 581, 583 (Ill. 1992) (“In an Illinois land 
trust, the interests of the trustee and the beneficiary together aggregate fee simple ownership . . . There 
are no express provisions in the Condominium Property Act or defendant’s by-laws or declaration 
indicating that a developer cannot be a unit owner.”). 
 79. See Robert S. Hunter, The Use Of The Living Trust, Generally, 19 ILL. PRAC., ESTATE 
PLANNING & ADMIN. § 221:1 (4th ed. 2020). Beneficiary means “a person that: (A) has a present or 
future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent, assuming nonexercise of powers of appoint-
ment,” while revocable means “revocable by the settlor without the consent of the trustee or a person 
holding an adverse interest. A revocable trust is deemed revocable during the settlor’s lifetime.” ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 3/103(3), (31). 
 80. Trial Transcript, supra note 74; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, at 15, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (de-
scribing the filing of a “revocable living trust”). 
 81. Trial Transcript, supra note 74; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, at 15, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870. 
 82. The following colloquy occurred: 
LAWYER: There’s also another section of the Declaration, Your Honor, which is Article 
1, Section 1 that says for purposes of this section, holders of beneficial interest under land 
trust holding title to any lot which is part of the property shall be considered owners. Mr. 
Goldberg never even asked if Mr. Anastacio fits into that definition, which he does, and he 
will testify to that effect. 
THE COURT: So he’s the beneficiary of the trust? 
LAWYER: Correct, his wife. 
THE COURT: That is the owner of the property? 
LAWYER: Correct.· He’s the owner by definition, plus according to the Declaration, he 
doesn’t need to be. 
Trial Transcript at 11–12, supra note 74. Counsel seemingly violated the ethical prohibition upon 
lawyers not to “assert personal knowledge if facts in issue except when testifying as a witness” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (“A lawyer shall not . . . assert personal knowledge of facts in 
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the 
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the court ruled on Count I, the following colloquy took place between de-
fense counsel and the trial judge: 
LAWYER: Your Honor, may I clarify something for the record, 
please? The exhibits 
that I’ve shown to you, have we admitted those or should we wait? 
THE COURT: Wait. 
LAWYER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Or you can ask that they be admitted. You just won’t 
be entitled to a directed finding at the close of this case. 
LAWYER: I’m going to wait, then.83 
The court ruled against Goldberg on this count because he did not 
introduce the very document withheld from him by opposing counsel and 
denied viewing and disclosure by the court.84 
c. Seeking and Imposing Unjustified Sanctions 
Goldberg filed a pretrial motion for sanctions against the lawyers, 
informing the court he filed the motion “because [he] wanted to ask the 
Court if [sanctions] would put an end to the false disparagement of [him] 
and also put an end to the defendants’ attorney bad faith and flawed inter-
pretation of law.”85 He complained that counsel improperly cited a libel 
case that referred to an inapplicable privilege that would effectively im-
munize them and anyone else from sanctions for litigation misconduct and 
that the case was not analogous to Goldberg’s.86 The court subsequently 
denied the motion for sanctions.87 
 
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused.” 
(emphasis added)); see also ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(A)(e). 
 83. Trial Transcript at 19, supra note 74. Judges are required to maintain impartial and “act at 
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality 
of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2; see also ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2 and 3(A)(9): “A 
judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”; “A judge 
shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial 
duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, . . .”). 
 84. Trial Transcript at 18–19, supra note 74. 
 85. Transcript of Proceedings at 16, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (transcript from proceedings on 
Aug. 26, 2014). 
 86. Id. at 29. Counsel argued “Statements made in open court are not—do not fall under [sanc-
tions] Rule 137, you know, and also these are, like I said, based on personal opinions and they’re 
interpretations of the law, that’s for the Court to decide.” Id. This proposition would of course negate 
all ethical duties of candor to the tribunal. 
 87. Id. at 43. 
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Counsel’s conduct in this case is outweighed by their chutzpa in 
seeking (and successfully obtaining) their own sanctions against Gold-
berg.88 In this segment of the case, the trial court seemingly showed bias 
in favor of defense counsel by awarding fees for the entirety of the HOA’s 
representation rather than for work done on sanctionable matters (of which 
in my view, or that of any reasonable person, there were none).89 Goldberg 
lost the case, but defense counsels’ petition for fees mischaracterized 
Goldberg’s complaint by using the terms “baseless” and “frivolous” to de-
scribe the suit. 90 They argued the following entitled them to fees: 
• Goldberg filed a motion for leave to subpoena defendants after 
they moved to quash his subpoena because it was issued without 
leave of court. 
• Goldberg purportedly agreed not to exchange discovery prior to 
trial (which he denied) and they “were forced to respond to two 
frivolous pleadings filed by Goldberg with respect to unauthor-
ized discovery.” 
• Goldberg’s motion for leave to file the subpoena he mistakenly 
filed without leave of court was scheduled [by the court clerk] 
for a separate date and time from when counsel had separately 
scheduled the hearing on their motion to quash the subpoena, 
“causing defendants to incur even more fees and costs.” 
• Goldberg’s motion for sanctions and leave to file an amended 
complaint were “both denied because they were baseless plead-
ings,” (although no such language was stated in these Orders or 
in the record other than counsel’s statements). 
• Goldberg “failed to present any facts or evidence in support of 
his remaining claims” (which was contradicted by his extensive 
testimony and admitted exhibits, in contrast to the absence of any 
defense evidence).91 
 
 88. Defendants’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (filed October 9, 2014). 
 89. Id. (Order granting defendants’ petition for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $16,672.75 on 
December 2, 2014). 
 90. Defendants’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees at 1, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870. 
 91. Id. at 2–3. At oral argument regarding the fees petition, counsel made the following addi-
tional representations: (1) “It was clear at the time of trial that plaintiff’s claims were baseless and he 
brought them based on his own personal opinions. They were not grounded in law or in fact”; (2) 
“Neither motion had any merit and the attempted discovery only proved he had no factual support 
whatsoever for his claims. In the small claims matter, defendants were forced to engage in and respond 
to at least five baseless motions and his subpoena, all of which were denied”; and (3) his “subjective 
opinion of the merits of his position is irrelevant as attorney/client must inquire into facts to support a 
legal claim. . . Mr. Goldberg insisted on a trial based lawsuit, and it’s our contention [that] the impo-
sition of sanctions against him is proper.” Id. at 4–5. 
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Had a lawyer been accused of such “(mis)conduct,” it is likely no 
reasonable judge would have entered sanctions against him or her. 
Goldberg subpoenaed a number of documents pretrial but was met 
with a motion to quash on grounds that the court rules required leave of 
court to conduct discovery.92 Upon receipt of the motion to quash, Gold-
berg attempted to correct his error by filing a motion for leave to take dis-
covery, which the court clerk happened to set for hearing on a date other 
than the defendants’ date for their motion to quash.93 In response, the HOA 
argued that Goldberg agreed not to conduct discovery—which Goldberg 
promptly denied and was not reflected in the record94—and that his request 
was merely a “fishing expedition.”95 The following occurred when Gold-
berg tried to argue that he had a right to the documents listed in his mo-
tion.96 The trial judge cut him off and denied the request in toto: 
THE COURT:· Anyway, it’s denied. 
MR. GOLDBERG:· I — 
THE COURT:· It’s denied. 
MR. GOLDBERG:· The whole thing is — 
THE COURT: Everything is denied.· Yes, I read it — 
LAWYER:·Thank you, Your Honor.97 
Goldberg went to trial on the surviving four counts. Citation of au-
thority is not needed for the proposition that actions which survive a mo-
tion to dismiss are by definition not frivolous.98 And losing a case at trial 
does not constitute a basis for sanctions, or else no one would want to 
practice law. The dismissal Order in this case made no finding that the 
 
 92. Transcript of Proceedings at 40, supra note 87. The Illinois small claims court rules provide: 
“No depositions shall be taken or interrogatories or other discovery proceeding or requests to admit 
be used prior to trial in small claims except by leave of court.” Ill. Sup. Ct. r. 287(a).  While Goldberg 
was held to strict compliance with the rule that permitted discovery only by leave of court, no such 
rule enforcement was carried out as to opposing counsel. If counsel believed subpoenas duces tecum 
constituted unauthorized discovery, their obligation was to first consult with Goldberg to informally 
resolve the dispute before seeking judicial relief. Ill. Sup. Ct. r. 201(k). No such effort was made by 
counsel, causing unnecessary filing of their motion to quash and a hearing about which they com-
plained in their fees petition that they were “forced” to do. 
 93. Motion for Leave to Subpoena Relevant Defendant Glenstone Corporate Documents in In-
stant Matter, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (filed on July 29, 2014). 
 94. Transcript of Proceedings at 37, supra note 87. 
 95. Id. at 38. 
 96. Id. at 35–36. 
 97. Id. at 39. 
 98. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989) (“We therefore hold that a complaint filed 
in forma pauperis is not automatically frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d) because it fails to 
state a claim.”). 
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claims were “baseless” or “frivolous.”99 However, there is more to this 
story. 
In response to the claim that Goldberg’s suit was merely based on 
“personal opinion” and not based on a reasonable inquiry,100 Goldberg 
cited five attorney-authored writings that he had consulted before filing 
his complaint regarding HOA board member eligibility to show he had a 
reasonable basis at law for the action. 101 But the court refused to consider 
these on hearsay grounds, even though they weren’t being offered for the 
truth of the matters therein.102 Goldberg pleaded: “I’m not an experienced 
litigator, and that’s something that the Court should take into account is 
the level of experience,” to which the judge responded: 
You chose to bring this pro se, that’s your choice and no, you come 
in here and you filed a lawsuit and you filed things. No. That’s the 
whole thing. You chose to do it and you chose to do it pro se. That’s 
not something the Court is going to consider. You come in here and 
it’s like gee, I got a bad appendix, I think I’ll try and take it out my-
self. Not a good idea. Go ahead.103 
These remarks tend to demonstrate the trial judge dressed Goldberg 
down (“ridiculed” him) for “masquerading” as a lawyer. The court further 
demonstrated a desire to punish Goldberg by inexplicably entering a fees 
award of $16,672.75 for the defense of all four counts tried and dismissed 
based on insufficient proof. The court never characterized any part of his 
case as being frivolous, which begs the following questions: would an at-
torney have been sanctioned in this manner; would any attorney so wrong-
fully accused of misconduct not file a counter-motion for sanctions in re-
sponse to opposing counsel filing a frivolous sanctions motion; wouldn’t 
 
 99. Order of the Court, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (granting defendants’ motions for directed 
findings on Counts 1, 2, 5, and 6 on September 19, 2014) (on file with author). 
 100. Id. at 27. 
 101. Id. at 9; see also Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees, Goldberg, 
No. 14 SC 1870 (filed on November 18, 2014) (Group Exhibit A). 
 102. There was no evidence that Goldberg failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry. Counsel hav-
ing earlier requested a delay of trial due to the “complex” issues it presented, knew from his pleadings 
that Goldberg had conducted extensive research and that the pleadings were highly detailed factually 
and legally. Goldberg’s effort to support his position with lawyer-written articles about eligibility re-
quirements under the CICAA to sit on HOA boards which contained legal authorities and argument 
were rejected by the court at both the trial based on counsel’s hearsay objection—as well as the fees 
hearing. In contrast, defense counsel cited law review articles in their pleadings, and these would not 
have been similarly rejected on hearsay grounds. This is another example of the court’s bias against 
an expert SRL, that is, applying evidentiary rules strictly against them, but not against opposing coun-
sel. 
 103. Transcript of Proceedings at 17, Goldberg, No. 14 SC 1870 (transcript from proceedings on 
Nov. 18, 2014). 
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a reasonable judge see the unprofessional (Goliath-like) nature of coun-
sel’s conduct in seeking unfounded sanctions against the SRL in such a 
case? 
In addition to affirming the trial court’s decisions and its fees 
award,104 the appellate court granted the defendants’ petition for an addi-
tional $15,827 in attorneys’ fees and costs for the entirety of their work on 
appeal.105 The appellate court reiterated the reasons given by the trial court 
in imposing sanctions, including his alleged failure to produce the trust 
document defense counsel withheld and to which the trial court had denied 
access.106 The court believed Goldberg reiterated many of the same, sanc-
tionable arguments and that the arguments had “become no less sanction-
able when repeated.”107 The defendants prevailed on the merits and on 
their fees petitions by demonstrably taking undue advantage of both the 
lack of legal sophistication of their pro se adversary, as well as the trial 
judge’s erroneous presumption that representations by licensed Illinois at-
torneys as to the facts and the law were unquestionably truthful when they 
were not. 
Unfortunately, the appellate court also committed the same error 
when it relied upon the same misrepresentations in its unpublished opin-
ion, failed to carefully consult the critical statute (§ 1-25(a) of the CICAA), 
 
 104. Under Illinois Rule 137, sanction for attorneys’ fees at trial is a “drastic” remedy and only 
imposed where other enforcement efforts have failed and shown to be a “deliberate and continuing 
disregard for the court’s authority.” Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co., 973 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ill. 2012) (citing 
Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 651 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. 1995)). Goldberg was not even alleged to have 
engaged in any “deliberate and continuing disregard for the court’s authority.” Santiago, 973 N.E.2d 
at 862. He merely exercised his right to self-representation, filed pleadings based on his understanding 
of the rules, the law, and the facts, and lost his case due to lawyer misconduct and judicial bias. The 
fees awarded clearly added insult to injury and did indeed show me “how Illinois courts treat pro se 
litigants.” 
 105. Rule 375(b) is penal in nature; its purpose is to “condemn and punish the abusive conduct 
of litigation and their attorneys who appear before us.” Fraser v. Jackson, 12 N.E.3d 62, 74 (2014).; 
See also Bank of Chi. V. Park Nat’l Bank, 277 Ill. App. 3d 167, 174, 660 N.E.2d 19, 24 (1995) (“If, 
under an objective standard of conduct, a reasonably prudent attorney in good faith could have brought 
the appeal, a request for sanctions will be denied.”). 
 106. Goldberg v. Glenstone Homeowners Ass’n, No. 2–14–1025, 2015 WL 7568483, at *17–19 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 107. Id. at *19. The implication of this comment is that anyone sanctioned by a trial court may 
not on appeal repeat arguments made below or risk being sanctioned again. In other words, there is no 
appeal from sanctions unless new arguments not previously made at trial occur (which would consti-
tute a waiver of review because they were not made at trial). It is probably good this was an un-
published opinion with no precedential value because beyond being a ludicrous proposition, it would 
also appear to apply as a statement of a general legal rule. It is as an exhibition of disgust with an 
expert SRL who relies upon the same rules of procedure and law and makes arguments as best he can 
similar to that of a practicing lawyer. 
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and added in my view entered unwarranted sanctions108 to punish (“ridi-
cule”) this expert SRL for appealing109 an adverse decision as any reason-
able attorney would have done under the circumstance.110 The implications 
of the court’s opinion are likely that an SRL who appeals an adverse deci-
sion for failure of proof should be sanctioned.111 The case here involved 
valid legal issues in six counts involving multiple statutes and documents 
brought by a literate and considerate SRL but who met unexpected unpro-
fessional conduct by counsel and the court. Any reasonable lawyer would 
have raised the issues Goldberg did as part of zealous advocacy. Sure, 
some of the claims may have been, as in any trial or appeal, stronger than 
others, but that does not make them sanctionable. 
Moreover, any reasonable attorney would appeal claims that stated a 
cause of action but were later lost at trial or dismissed, especially where a 
prima facie case is made and, like here, no contrary evidence is introduced 
by the opposing party. But for defense counsels’ false allegations in the 
pleadings, false statement of law at trial, withholding of material evidence, 
and the court’s inappropriate strategic guidance to counsel not to offer crit-
ical documents into evidence, the defendants would not have prevailed. 112 
2. Ensuring Unbiased and Competent Appellate Review 
In an unpublished opinion modified on rehearing, the appellate court 
affirmed all of the trial judge’s rulings and entered an additional fees 
award on defense counsels’ motion, covering the entirety of counsel’s fees 
 
 108. Sanctions on appeal are authorized under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(b) for, inter alia, 
filing a “frivolous” appeal (“An appeal or other action will be deemed frivolous where it is not rea-
sonably well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”). 
 109. No lawyer would be sanctioned for these trivial acts in litigation. 
 110. In granting a Rule 375(b) sanctions petition, the court asks whether the act taken by the 
individual being sanctioned was not a good faith effort that would have been taken by a reasonable 
and prudent attorney. Gilkey v. Scholl, 595 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). An “objective stand-
ard of conduct” is used under Rule 375(b). Bank of Chicago v. Park Nat’l Bank, 660 N.E.2d 19, 24 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“If, under an objective standard of conduct, a reasonably prudent attorney in good 
faith could have brought the appeal, a request for sanctions will be denied.”). 
 111. Some judges may be easily persuaded that claims are frivolous, even if they survive a mo-
tion to dismiss, by hearing opposing counsel repeatedly calling them frivolous. 
 112. For me, this entire saga was a plain miscarriage of justice warranting my intervention as an 
officer of the court. My efforts to support Goldberg by filing an amicus brief in support of his petition 
for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, to bring the matter to the attention of the Illinois 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (which refused to investigate my 29-page com-
plaint against the lawyers), and my motion to the latter court to enter a supervisory order directing the 
IARDC to investigate the matter were all unsuccessful. Complaint from Jona Goldschmidt to the Illi-
nois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n (on file with author). 
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for the appeal.113 Addressing Goldberg’s Count I claim the appellate court 
reasoned that: 
Fatal to Goldberg’s claim is a lack of evidence that Anastacio needed 
to be an Association member in order to be a validly-elected director 
. . . Nor does the Community Act aid Goldberg. Section 1–5 defines 
“member” as a person or entity designated as an owner and entitled 
to vote under the relevant community instrument. 765 ILCS 160/1–5 
(West 2012). And Section 1–25 states that directors shall be elected 
by the members in accordance with the relevant community instru-
ment. 765 ILCS 160/1–25(a) (West 2012). Both sections defer to the 
relevant community instrument—here, the Declaration. The Commu-
nity Act does not otherwise restrict who may be a director. We have 
already determined that the Declaration does not require that 
Anastacio have been a member to be a director, and therefore, the 
Community Act does not advance his argument . . . [I]t is up to the 
articles of incorporation and bylaws to prescribe qualifications for 
directors. Again, the Declaration controls, and it did not require that 
Anastacio be a member to serve on the board of directors.114 
Shockingly, the italicized language is false and mischaracterizes the 
language of §1-25(a) of the CICAA (entitled “Board of managers, board 
of directors, duties, elections, and voting”) which Goldberg cited and re-
lied upon, and which establishes a statutory procedure for electing home-
owner association board members to be elected “from among the member-
ship.”115 The appellate court cited but misstated § 1-25(a), erroneously 
stating that “Both sections [§§ 1-5 and 1-25(a)] defer to the relevant com-
munity instrument—here, the Declaration. The Community Act does not 
otherwise restrict who may be a director.”116 It appears that neither the trial 
court nor the appellate court really studied the statute. One has to wonder 
as Goldberg did: how is this possible? Does this mean four different judges 
(one at trial and three on appeal) failed to examine the record and find the 
law as written where the issue was thoroughly briefed and debated? 
Rather than deal with the § 1-25(a) issue, the appellate court focused 
solely on the defense’s argument that Goldberg did not prove a negative, 
 
 113. Goldberg v. Glenstone Homeowners’ Ass’n, No. 2-14-1025, 2015 WL 7568483 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Nov. 24, 2015) (modified opinion on reharing), pet. for leave to appeal denied, 50 N.E.3d 1139 
(Ill. 2016). 
 114. Id. at *11 (emphasis added). 
 115. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/1-25(a) (“Elections shall be held in accordance with the commu-
nity instruments, provided that an election shall be held no less frequently than once every 24 months, 
for the board of managers or board of directors from among the membership of a common interest 
community association.”). 
 116. Id. 
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i.e., that the putative board member was not, as defense represented with-
out evidence, a beneficiary of a land trust.117 The admission of the certified 
copy of the county clerk’s filing record showed that the putative board 
member conveyed his property to his wife’s “revocable living trust.”118 In 
the normal course of litigation, the court would require an evidentiary re-
sponse as a matter of burden shifting119 once Goldberg introduced that ex-
hibit. Instead, the court relied again simply on counsel’s oral representa-
tion regarding the nature of the trust and instructed her not to enter it into 
evidence; thus, the appellate court inexplicably held Goldberg did not in-
troduce the critical trust document which only defense possessed and 
never introduced into evidence—much less provided access to the docu-
ment through discovery which the trial court also denied.120 
How many lawyers lose trials and appeals because there was a lack 
of evidence to prove an element in their respective cause of action; or be-
cause case law was not exactly on point; or because the court interpreted 
the language of a document differently than a party? Most lawyers expe-
rience losing a trial or appeal on these or similar grounds, but do they ex-
pect to be sanctioned for appealing a case they lost? Obviously, this is a 
rhetorical question, but the answer is different when it comes to an expert 
SRL who does their best to plead a case, loses at trial, is sanctioned for 
bringing the case, and then sanctioned again for appealing the adverse de-
cision. All this seems to suggest the appellate court here joined the trial 
court in “ridiculing” the SRL for “masquerading” as a lawyer. 
III. CASE #2: THE WILL CONTEST 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
This case, Oakland v. Bell State Bank & Trust,121 also involves an 
educated SRL (a social worker) who from reading the record also filed 
well-written pleadings citing relevant authorities, followed procedural 
 
 117. Goldberg, 2015 WL 7568483, at *11. 
 118. Trial Transcript at 15, supra note 74.  The appellate opinion makes no reference to this 
evidence. 
 119. See People v. Helt, 892 N.E.2d 594, 596–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“‘A hearing on a petition 
to rescind a summary suspension of driving privileges is a civil proceeding.’. . . The defendant bears 
the burden of proof and, if he or she establishes a prima facie case for rescission by presenting at least 
some evidence on every element essential to the cause of action, the burden shifts to the State to come 
forward with evidence justifying the suspension.”); People v. Orth, 530 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Ill. 1988) 
(“Since the motorist was not put on notice that he was required to present a prima facie case for re-
scission, on remand he must be given an opportunity to do so. If, and only if, he presents such a case, 
the burden will shift to the State to come forward with evidence in rebuttal justifying suspension.”). 
 120. Goldberg, 2015 WL 7568483, at *11. 
 121. In re Estate of Gassman, 867 N.W.2d 325 (N.D. 2015), cert. denied, sub. nom., Oakland v. 
Bell State Bank & Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (Mem) (2016). 
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rules, and made articulate arguments in court.122 In 2015, Margaret Oak-
land contacted me seeking assistance in filing an amicus brief with the 
U.S. Supreme Court, supporting her pending petition for certiorari; in the 
petition, she sought discretionary review of a state supreme court decision 
in a probate matter.123 She raised, inter alia, a due process issue regarding 
the failure of the trial judge to afford her a reasonable accommodation.124 
Given my interest in the subject matter and the merits of her case, I filed 
an amicus brief supporting her position.125 Not surprisingly, the cert peti-
tion was denied. 
Oakland was the only child of her father, a successful lawyer and 
farmer, who beginning in the 1980s, suffered from a belief that people 
were poisoning him to secure his farmland, including his divorced spouse. 
126 He instructed Oakland never to have contact with her mother (the ex-
spouse), or he would consider Oakland to be a co-conspirator. 127 Oak-
land’s father would eventually tell others he believed Oakland was poi-
soning him.128 She possessed additional evidence of other delusions,129 and 
her father had in fact once been diagnosed with a delusional disorder but 
refused psychiatric treatment.130 He left all his farmland to the descendants 
of a woman he had met after his divorce, leaving out his daughter.131 
Oakland was prepared to prove at trial that her father suffered from 
multiple delusions twenty years prior, during, and after the time of signing 
his 2011 will.132 The day before trial, the court heard eleven motions in 
limine filed by the bank which defended the validity of the will.133 The 
motions sought exclusion of most of Oakland’s intended witnesses unless 
the testimony related to the poisoning delusion that existed at the time of 
or immediately before the will’s execution.134 The court reasoned that no 
 
 122. At one hearing, defense counsel even remarked “we’ve got hundreds of pleadings” in the 
case. Transcript of Proceedings at 8, Oakland v. Bell State Bank & Trust Co., 02-2012-PR-00014 
(transcript from Jan. 27, 2014). 
 123. Oakland, 136 S. Ct. at 1494. 
 124. Oakland, 136 S. Ct. 1493. 
 125. Motion For Leave to File and Brief of Amici Professor Jona Goldschmidt and Attorney 
Mark Andrews in Support of Petitioner, Oakland, 136 S. Ct. 1493. 
 126. Id. at *9-10. 
 127. Id. at *10. 
 128. Id. at *11. 
 129. Oakland’s father did not believe she was his daughter or that he was the son of his biological 
father. Transcript of Proceedings at 17, supra note 124. He believed in aliens and that the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers had infected him with cancer because of his prior successful litigation against it. 
See Report of Proceedings at 273, Oakland, supra note 124 (transcript of Jan. 28, 2014). 
 130. Report of Proceeding at 41 (transcript of Jan. 29, 2014), supra note 124. 
 131. Id. at *12. 
 132. Id. at *10, *12. 
 133. Transcript of Proceedings (transcript of Jan. 28, 2014), supra note 124. 
 134. As Oakland wrote in her Petition: “By proposing inappropriately narrow parameters for 
proof of a mental illness that spanned decades and manifested through a broad range of delusional 
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witness testimonies other than those pertaining to the poisoning delusion 
would be relevant because—agreeing with defense counsel’s position—
the expert only testified to that delusion.135 This rationale led the court to 
rule that most of Oakland’s fact witnesses would be excluded.136 At the 
hearing on the motions in limine, Oakland and opposing counsel vigor-
ously argued the evidentiary issues raised, but at no time was there men-
tion of her duty to make an offer of proof at trial on the motions.137 At 
trial, the jury ruled in favor of the bank, and Oakland filed a motion for a 
new trial.138 Neither before or during trial did the court explain the require-
ment and process for making an offer of proof,139 nor did the court explain 
the fatal result of failing to make an offer of proof at trial.140 
At the post-trial hearing, defense counsel argued that Oakland 
“didn’t put forward the testimony” she sought to offer at trial: 
[S]o the offer of proof of proof that she claims she said something 
like, oh, I intended or the anticipated testimony. That’s not how this 
works. You do an offer of proof so we could hear the testimony, the 
trial court can hear it and then we have a record for the appeal so the 
Supreme Court can look at it if need be. Intention is not evidence. 
 
statements and behaviors, the Bank targeted most of Oakland’s evidence on a critical issue of fact.” 
Petition, Oakland, 136 S. Ct. 1493. 
 135. Transcript of Proceedings at 17–18 (transcript of Jan. 28, 2014), supra note 124. 
 136. Id. 
 137. “Oakland, however, made no other offers of proof about other evidence indicating 
Gassmann’s state of mind near the time when he executed his will. Before trial, the parties addressed 
Dalhoff’s deposition testimony and the court ruled on objections made during the taking of that dep-
osition. However, the record reflects that court did not review the entire contents of Dalhoff’s deposi-
tion and Oakland made no offer of proof about the deposition at trial. Moreover, although Oakland 
claims Bonello attended the trial, she made no offer of proof about his proposed testimony at trial. . . 
[S]he failed to make appropriate offers of proof for the evidence she now claims was improperly 
excluded. On this record, we cannot say the district court’s rulings on Bell State’s motions in limine 
were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and we conclude Oakland did not make an appropriate 
offer of proof at trial to properly preserve issues about the evidence she now claims was improperly 
excluded, including Dalhoff’s deposition testimony and Bonello’s proposed testimony.” In re Estate 
of Gassman, 867 N.W.2d 325, 330–32, 335 (N.D. 2015). 
 138. Report of Proceeding at 3 (transcript of Jan. 29, 2014), supra note 124. 
 139. “The proponent of evidence bears the burden of making an offer of proof when there is an 
objection to the introduction of evidence so that there is a record of the specific evidence sought to be 
excluded.” 88 C.J.S. Trial § 175 (citations omitted). A proffer of excluded evidence “should make 
known the substance of the expected evidence in question so as to make clear to the court what is 
being offered in proof, and why the offer should be admitted over the opponent’s objections, so that 
the court may make an informed ruling.” 88 C.J.S. Trial § 177 (citation omitted). 
 140. Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 411 (N.D. 1994) (exclusion 
of evidence by a motion in limine does not dispense with the requirement of an offer of proof so the 
trial court can consider the proffered evidence in the context of other evidence presented during trial). 
Jurisdictions differ on when the offer should be made. “While in some jurisdictions the offer of proof 
should not be made until the court has sustained an objection to a question asked, in other jurisdictions, 
the court must be informed before making its ruling as to what answers are expected to be elicited 
from the witness.” 88 C.J.S. Trial § 180. 
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Nobody prevented her from putting these people on the stand. . . [I]f 
she were represented by legal counsel, legal counsel would have put 
those people on the stand. And so we deal with that in an offer of 
proof. She chose not to do that, I don’t know why but she didn’t do 
it.141 
Oakland argued that she had made appropriate offers of proof by 
making every effort to assist the court in making an informed decision on 
the motions before it.142 She also directed the court’s attention to N.D. Rule 
of Evidence 103. That rule states, in relevant part: 
(a) A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence 
only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and: 
(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record: 
(A) timely objects or moves to strike; and 
(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the 
 context; or 
(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its 
substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent 
from the context.143 
In other words, Oakland interpreted an “offer of proof” literally. She 
believed that by offering descriptions of her named witnesses and explain-
ing the relevance of their expected testimony during the motion in limine 
hearing, she was complying with the rule’s requirement. She tactfully em-
phasized to the court that, “I think, you know, the fundamental issue [quot-
ing Rule 103] is substantial justice and that is, you know, one of the court’s 
primary functions more so than to, you know, judge who is – who is, you 
know, bringing the most sophisticated offers of proof at the best time.144 
To no avail, the trial judge denied her motion or new trial because there 
was “no basis for a new trial.”145 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on the same 
grounds: Oakland “made no offer of proof about other remote statements 
excluded by the court, and in the absence of an appropriate offer of proof, 
we are unable to review her claim the court erred in excluding remote ev-
idence of his alleged insane delusion.”146 The court repeated this defi-
ciency on her part in several other places in its opinion.147 
 
 141. Report of Proceeding at 26–27 (transcript of May 19, 2014), supra note 124. 
 142. Id. at 8–9. 
 143. North Dakota R. Evid. 103(a) (emphasis added). 
 144. Report of Proceeding at 11–12, supra note 143. 
 145. Id. at 43. 
 146. In re Estate of Gassmann, 867 N.W.2d at 332. 
 147. Id. (emphasis added). 
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B. Reasonable Accommodations Not Provided 
1. Providing Procedural Information to Preserve Appellate Rights 
The issue here is that Oakland was not informed about the need to 
make an offer of proof to preserve evidentiary ruling errors for a new trial 
motion or appeal. This would have been less of an accommodation and 
more of a matter of communicating basic procedural information Oakland 
was entitled to, so that her case could be fairly heard. In other words, Oak-
land—while an intelligent litigant facing a bank’s flurry of motions—was 
never informed of the requirement from case law that established her duty 
to make an offer of proof at trial to preserve her right to appeal evidentiary 
exclusion rulings—something lawyers learn in law school. 
Rule 103 contains no definition of “offer of proof,” fails to mention 
the word “trial,” and cites to no case law establishing the appellate issue 
waiver rule. Even an expert SRL like Oakland had no understanding of the 
offer-of-proof requirement which prejudiced her case post-trial and on ap-
peal.148 She wrote to me recently that “I make a terrible trial lawyer: too 
slow, too mousy, and I lack the confidence. But I might have done ok, if 
the court had tried to level the playing field rather than pushing me further 
down.”149 Both counsel and the court were “hiding the ball” from Oakland, 
requiring her to follow the same procedural rules as lawyers, but not in-
forming her of a critical, unstated rule. Despite mine and co-counsel’s ar-
gument as amici that the trial judge had ethical and due process obligations 
to inform Oakland of the meaning and requirement of making an offer of 
proof, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.150 
2. Distinguishing between Rule Non-Compliance and Imperfect Compli-
ance 
This point goes to the previous discussion in so far as Oakland made 
great efforts to establish the validity of her intended witness testimony as 
the court ruled one by one on the eleven motions in limine.151 In reality, 
 
 148. She recently commented on the court’s motion in limine hearing: “January 27: I remember 
this day well. This is when it first hit me that the judge was agreeing to ‘exclude’ whatever evidence 
the other side asked for, but I did not understand that he was just excluding the evidence ‘in limine’ 
and that what needed to be done was to make an offer of proof. I felt so terrible. My cousin had traveled 
there to read the transcript of the deposition by my aunt, and they just DECIMATED it. Trouble is, I 
didn’t understand that there was a way to save it and to get the ‘excluded’ evidence back in.” Email 
from Margaret Oakland to Author (Apr. 16, 2021, 10:06 CST) (on file with author). 
 149. Email from Margaret Oakland to Author (Apr. 17, 2021, 12:46 CST) (on file with author). 
 150. Oakland v. Bell State Bank & Trust, 136 S.Ct. 1493 (2016) (Mem). 
 151. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 127. 
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she did not engage in rule non-compliance, as such, in failing to make of-
fers of proof at trial; her inaction was a form of imperfect compliance.152 
As such, given Oakland’s SRL status and her good faith effort in respond-
ing to the motions in limine, the trial court as well as the North Dakota 
Supreme Court should have treated her responses to the motions as equiv-
alent to making an offer of proof at trial, permitting appellate review of 
the rulings. This is especially so because North Dakota follows ABA Rule 
2.2, and Comment [4], authorizing reasonable accommodations to SRLs 
so their cases are “fairly heard.”153 
IV. THE VETERAN’S MORTGAGE APPLICATION CLAIM 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Andrew Prescott is a U.S. Army veteran with a B.S. in Mathematics, 
has worked numerous retail jobs in his life, and is self-taught in the fields 
of science, philosophy, psychology, theology, religious texts, spiritual 
texts, classic literature, and other writings.154 My review of the record in 
his case indicates that he—like the other two SRLs—submitted detailed 
submissions to the court that were clearly written and cited to legal author-
ities.155 
Prescott was looking for a VA mortgage to make improvements on a 
property in Florida where he resides.156 Through a mortgage broker, Pres-
cott was referred to an Illinois bank as a potential VA authorized lender.157 
 
 152. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444 n.5 (1962) (holding that judges should 
take a “liberal view of papers” filed by pro se prisoners, which it found to be “equivalents of notices 
of appeal” despite technical deficiencies); Becker v. Montgomery, 582 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (holding 
that “imperfection in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who 
is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court” where appellant filed a notice of appeal 
with a typed instead of a required original signature); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 247 (1992) (hold-
ing that premature notice and appellate brief filing within time for filing notice of appeal was suffi-
cient). State courts have also followed a similar approach, construing certain documents as the func-
tional equivalent of those required by court rules. See, e.g., Hughes v. Habitat Apartments, 860 S.W.2d 
872 (Tex. 1993) (construing an in forma pauperis affidavit as an answer). Moreover, the non-compli-
ance—if one calls it that—would be considered a “soft bar” which should be excused and not a “hard 
bar” (like a statute of limitations). Albrecht, supra note 20. 
 153. North Dakota R. 2.2, [4] (“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable 
accommodations to ensure self-represented litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly 
heard.”). 
 154. Email from Andrew Prescott with Brief Biography to Author (Mar. 18, 2021, 7:53 CST) 
(on file with Author). 
 155. Sometimes he mistakenly cited to the federal rules instead of Illinois court rules in support 
of his motions. Report of Proceedings, Prescott v. Flanagan State Bank, No. 4-18-0246, 2018 WL 
6621327 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018); Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Pres-
cott, 2018 WL 6621327 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 18, 2017). 
 156. Complaint at Law, Prescott, 2018 WL 6621327. 
 157. Id.  
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At the time of the mortgage application, the property was not subject to 
liens but verification of an existing lien on the property was a requirement 
for the type of VA loan Prescott applied for. 158 He was unaware of this 
and expected the bank to know such requirements. 159 However, the bank 
failed to alert Prescott of the requirements and dragged its heels for six 
weeks. 160 Ultimately, Prescott was forced to withdraw the mortgage ap-
plication and use credit cards and savings to make payments on the home, 
ruining his credit and making it impossible to get a mortgage elsewhere. 
161 
Like Goldberg, Prescott’s case has a somewhat complicated history 
involving multiple amended pleadings, multiple legal issues in multiple 
counts, back-and-forth dispositive motions, as well as two appeals. The 
first appeal dealt with a grant of the defendant bank’s motion for summary 
judgment on three of Prescott’s four counts, and the court affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment.162 While the first appeal was pending, the trial court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the last surviving 
count.163 
On May 16, 2019, the trial court entered judgment in the defendant’s 
favor on the remaining count.164 Prescott filed a timely motion for recon-
sideration on June 5, 2019, which was scheduled for hearing on August 
29, 2019.165 On June 27, 2019, Prescott moved to withdraw the motion for 
reconsideration and filed a motion for new trial. 166 At the hearing, the 
court granted Prescott’s motion to withdraw the motion for reconsidera-
tion, and then denied the motion for new trial on grounds it was “a late 
filing,” that is, because more than 30 days had expired since the May 16, 
2019 judgment.167 The appellate court followed suit and used Prescott’s 
alleged “untimely” filing of the motion for new trial as grounds to dismiss 
the appeal 168 and stating “[w]hile we understand and appreciate the trial 
courts desire to, for the benefit of the parties, address the merits, we find 
the court was without jurisdiction to do so.169 
 
 158. Report of Proceedings at 5, supra note 157. 
 159. Id. at 5–6. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Third Amended Complaint at Law, Prescott, 2018 WL 6621327 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 30, 
2018). 
 162. Prescott, 2018 WL 6621327, at *2. 
 163. Order of the Court, Prescott, 2018 WL 6621327 (Ill. Ct. App. May 16, 2019) (granting 
summary judgment and dismissing count II). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Report of Proceedings at 13, Prescott, 2018 WL 6621327 (Ill. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2019). 
 166. Id. at 16. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Prescott v. Flanagan State Bank (Prescott II), No. 4-19-0648, 2020 WL 397159, at *1 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2020). 
 169. Id. at *4. 
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B. Reasonable Accommodation Not Provided: Preventing “Traps for the 
Unwary” 
In this case, we have a trial judge who imposes strict compliance on 
SRLs in so far as the 30-day requirement for filing post-trial motions.170 I 
suspect that under the facts described, most lawyers would request that the 
court consider Prescott’s motion for new trial to supplement, amend, or 
relate back to the earlier motion for reconsideration. However, the judge 
in this case decided to apply the 30-day requirement strictly. Prescott fell 
into a trap such that he could not preserve his issues on appeal because he 
mistakenly obtained the order to withdraw his timely-filed motion for re-
consideration first before filing the proposed motion for a new trial, thus 
preventing his case from being fairly heard on appeal. Again, a reasonable 
accommodation by way of the court informing an SRL that what is being 
asked would destroy his appellate rights —i.e., to file a motion to replace 
the one that he wanted to withdraw—is not asking the court to overreach. 
Instead, the judge here would have only needed to spare a minute or two 
to explain the potential forfeiture of rights resulting from Prescott’s re-
quests. The Illinois Appellate Court then shirked its obligation to fairly 
hear this SRL’s case on appeal by employing a similarly strict interpreta-
tion of the 30-day rule, and thus failed to review the claim.171 
Where is the latitude that the United States Supreme Court requires 
in interpretation of SRLs’ pleadings? Why did the trial judge not allow the 
proposed motion for new trial to amend or supplement or relate back to 
the timely-filed motion for reconsideration? In my view, this was like 
many rulings in Goldberg’s and Oakland’s cases, a failure to provide a 
reasonable accommodation (an explanation of his unintended waiver of 
appellate rights) and a failure to hear the cases based on technical rule vi-
olations that demonstrably failed to consider the party’s pro se status. 
CONCLUSION 
These cases show how both expert and less sophisticated SRL’s are 
equally subject to injustice brought upon by lawyers and judges at trial and 
on appeal. The case studies also demonstrate how the judiciary provides 
no accommodations to SRLs—much less reasonable ones—and a failure 
of judicial economy by requiring the filing and consideration of appeals 
that would probably be unnecessary had accommodations been afforded 
in the first instance. Affirmative, reasonable accommodations to the SRLs 
in these cases would have ensured the cases were fairly heard. 
 
 170. Report of Proceedings, supra note 157, at 16. 
 171. Prescott II, 2020 WL 397159, at *4. 
2021] Equal Injustice for All 107 
Goldberg faced not only unprofessional conduct by opposing counsel 
but also possible judicial misconduct. If the court were mandated to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations of the required and permissible forms,172 
these would have included: (a) ordering discovery of crucial documents; 
(b) verifying the SRL’s claim regarding the language of a particular statute 
where opposing counsel asserts that the law does not exist; (c) holding 
counsel to the same degree of strict rule compliance as the SRL; and (d) 
giving greater consideration to his pro se status, good faith efforts in all 
matters before the court, and lack of any contumacious conduct when con-
sidering counsel’s motion for sanctions against him. I argue these accom-
modations are more properly considered required forms of assistance. 
With Oakland, all the court had to do by way of a reasonable accom-
modation was to explain what an “offer of proof” was in a timely manner, 
that is, at the time the court sustained eleven motions in limine that the 
bank filed against her. No more than a minute of the court’s time in expla-
nation would have afforded Oakland the opportunity to establish the pro-
posed witness testimony to explain the length and multitude of her father’s 
delusions, or at least preserve the exclusion issues on appeal. The court’s 
lack of accommodation cost Oakland the right to appeal the issues and an 
injustice that could have been easily avoided. This procedural explanation 
should be a required form of assistance. And despite substantive 
knowledge of the law pertaining to veterans’ benefits, mortgages and the 
various elements of the causes of action brought, Prescott too was unjustly 
ensnared in a procedural trap. His error in filing a timely post-trial mo-
tion—and before it is heard, filing a second motion after 30-days asking 
that the first be replaced, making the second motion untimely—is the exact 
kind of “trap for the unwary” that the Supreme Court holds must be 
avoided.173 
These SRLs were not seeking legal advice. They wanted both ethical 
adversaries and impartial judges, and basic information so they could 
properly present their cases and have them heard on their merits at trial 
and on appeal. If injustice can be meted out so heartlessly to expert SRLs 
 
 172. See Jona Goldschmidt, Required, Permissible, and Impermissible Forms of Fedeeral Judi-
cial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Toward Establishment of a Judicial Duty of Reasonable 
Assistance, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 217, 224 (2019) (collecting examples of re-
quired, permissible, and impermissible forms of federal judicial assistance). 
 173. For example, “trap for the unwary” is used in the context of entrapment. United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (“[T]o determine whether entrapment has been established, a line 
must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” (citing 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1973))); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) 
(referring to the “complete exhaustion” rule of habeas proceedings as not being a trap for the unwary); 
Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U.S. 228, 231 (1927) (“The statute and the regulations must be read in the 
light of their purpose. They are devised, not as traps for the unwary, but for the convenience of gov-
ernment officials in passing upon claims for refund and in preparing for trial.”). 
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as was done here—perhaps because they were viewed by the court as 
“masquerading” as lawyers—what happens to the less educated and lit-
erate SRLs who do not have such litigation competence? We know from 
a recent empirical study that judicial policies of strict rule compliance and 
lack of judicial assistance are in fact pervasive in our state courts to the 
detriment of less sophisticated SRLs.174 
The cases described support current research findings and show that 
some courts are generally focused exclusively on strict rule compliance as 
mandated by the Supreme Court such that cases are not fairly heard on the 
merits, appeals are rejected, and gross miscarriages of justice are ignored 
at trial and on appeal. To avoid the carousel of systemic injustice, courts 
should be encouraged, or preferably, required to provide reasonable assis-
tance to SRLs by modifying Comment [4] and the state variants. Reason-
able assistance to SRL should be mandatory in order to preserve judicial 
economy at trial and on appeal, to ensure that cases are “fairly heard” on 
their merits, and to promote public trust and confidence in the justice sys-
tem. 
 
 174. Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica K. Steinberg, & Alyx Mark, Judges in 
Lawyerless Courts, 110 GEO. L.J. ___, at 54 (forthcoming 2022) (reporting the results of 200 hours of 
court observations of SRL cases in three jurisdictions, and concluding that “judges maintain court 
complexity, including using jargon and refusing to explain court processes and legal terms, strictly 
control and limit party testimony, and do not adjust their behavior to account for the consistent and 
robust pre-hearing case development assistance provided to only one side of the cases we studied.”). 
